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Abstract So far, cellular networks have been operated in
private frequency bands. But recently, several researchers and
legislators have argued in favor of a more exible and more
efcient management of the spectrum, leading to the possible
coexistence of several network operators in a shared frequency
band. In our paper, we study this situation in detail, assuming
that mobile devices can freely roam among the various operators.
Free roaming means that the mobile devices measure the signal
strength of the pilot signals (i.e., beacon signals) of the base
stations and attach to the base station with the strongest pilot
signal. We model the behavior of the network operators in a game
theoretic setting in which each operator decides the power of the
pilot signal of its base stations. We rst identify possible Nash
equilibria in the theoretical setting in which all base stations are
located on the vertices of a two-dimensional lattice. We then relax
this topological assumption and show that, in the more general
case, nding the Nash equilibria is an NP-complete problem.
Finally, we prove that a socially optimal Nash equilibrium exists
and that it can be enforced by using punishments.
Index Terms Wireless networks, shared spectrum, coopera-
tion, game theory, Nash equilibrium, NP-completeness
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular networks are notoriously difficult to design and
operate; in particular, defining the optimal location of the base
stations and fine tuning their configuration parameters is very
challenging. For this reason, government agencies (such as
the FCC for the US) have sold or rented, for example by
auction, each operator a frequency band for its exclusive usage
in a given country or region. Only a small part of the whole
spectrum is allocated as a shared spectrum, in which networks
function in the same (unlicensed) frequency band.
With the progress of technology and the fast growing
demand for ubiquitous high-speed wireless services, it is clear
that the pressure towards more flexibility of the usage of
the spectrum will only increase. Therefore, the government
agencies are likely to adapt the current regulations in order
to increase the proportion of the unlicensed spectrum as
discussed in [3], [7].
The evolution towards unlicensed frequency bands can lead
to a better usage of the spectrum. Yet, it would also create
a novel situation, in which the base stations of different
operators would interfere with each other. An operator may
be tempted to let its base stations transmit at the maximum
authorized level. But by doing this, it would maximize inter-
ference not only to its own base stations, but also to the base
stations of the other operators, and to all mobile devices in
the power range of its base stations; in addition, it would face
the danger that the other operators retaliate by behaving in the
same way.
In our paper, we assume that mobile users can freely roam
across the base stations located in their neighborhood, attach-
ing to the one offering the most favorable signal quality (i.e.,
the base station with the strongest pilot signal), irrespectively
of the operator to which the base station belongs1. From the
interference perspective, this operating principle is much more
efficient than the current practice, because it enables mobile
devices to find the “closest” base station in the area and hence
mobile devices and base stations can significantly decrease
their transmission power. This free roaming could be beneficial
for both operators and users, because the former could serve an
increased set of users, whereas the latter could enjoy various
services across several operators.
We also assume that the operators want to cover the largest
possible area by increasing the transmission range of their base
stations. At the same time, they want to minimize interference.
We assume that these two contradictory goals correspond to
maximizing the number of users who attach to their base
stations. We model this situation as a game in terms of power
control of the base stations.
Note that the general problem of power control of base
stations is hard to solve (i.e., NP-complete); it is characterized
by the following dimensions: (i) the size of the base station
sets, (ii) the geographic locations of the base stations and (iii)
their possible radio ranges.
Game theory was already used to study the power control of
user devices in wireless networks, notably in cellular systems
as studied in [1], [9], [12], [13], [14], [16], [26] and [28].
Game theory was also used to study cooperation in wireless
ad hoc networks, for example in [5], [15] and [23], in particular
for cooperative power control [17]. A general framework for
resource allocation in wireless network was addressed in [6].
Recently, the coexistence of multiple Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) was studied in [22]. The authors consider
both transit and customer prices for the ISPs. They show that
if the number of ISPs competing for the same customers is
large, then it can lead to price wars. In addition to this work in
wired networks, the coexistence of wireless operators in a non-
shared spectrum was addressed in two contributions. In [10],
Halldo´rsson et al. study channel assignment strategies for Wi-
Fi operators. They use the maximum graph coloring problem
1The users might have other attachment preferences based on subscription
type, past experience, etc. We will consider the extension of user attachment
behavior in our future work.
2to identify Nash equilibria and they also provide a bound on
the price of anarchy of these equilibria. In another paper [27],
Zemlianov and de Veciana consider the scenario, in which
users are able to choose between a cellular network and a Wi-
Fi network. They show that congestion sensitive strategies are
better than proximity-based strategies. None of these works
considers the power control of the base stations.
Our paper addresses the problem of pilot signal power
control in shared spectrum networks. Haykin provides a
comprehensive overview [11] of the current tendencies and
research challenges in shared spectrum communications in
general. One of the challenges, namely opportunistic spectrum
access is addressed in the paper of Wang et al. [25].
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section II,
we describe the system model and the corresponding power
control game. We solve this game on a two-dimensional lattice
topology in Section III. In Section IV, we present our results
in the case of a general topology of base stations. We extend
our study with a repeated game model in Section V. Finally,
we conclude in Section VI.
II. MODEL
A. System Model
In our paper, we make the following assumptions with re-
spect to the communication network. We assume two wireless
communication networks, each operated by an operator and
we call the operators A and B. Operator i ∈ {A,B} controls
a set of base stations (BS-s) denoted by Bi. We denote the
union of all base stations by B. We also assume several users
equipped with mobile devices to access the communication
network. The networks reside in a given area, where the
operators want to provide wireless access for the users. We
consider two operators to provide an insight in the basic
principles of cooperation in a multi-operator context. Note
that our results for a general network topology presented in
Sections IV and V hold for more than two operators as well.
We assume that the radios of the base stations and the
mobile devices are compatible, meaning that any user is able
to access the network via any of the base stations. Base
stations and mobiles operate on the same unlicensed band of
the frequency spectrum. Each might perform power control
to optimize its transmission power and reduce interference.
This optimization can be realized in three ways: the power
control of the pilot signal of the BS-s, downlink (BS to mobile)
and uplink (mobile to BS) power control. In this paper, we
focus on the first problem and we postpone the investigation
of the other two problems to our future work. To mitigate
interference, the shared frequency band is usually split up into
channels (i.e., separated frequency sub-bands), but the pilot
signal is typically emitted on a single shared channel for all
the base stations, which results in mutual interference of the
pilot signals (in CDMA networks, the interference of the pilot
signals is referred to as the pilot pollution [21]).
According to the physical model of signal propagation [21],
the pilot signal of a base station bi ∈ B can be received by
a user device u if its signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR)
exceeds a reception threshold β:
Pi · d−αiu
N0 +
∑
j∈B,j 6=i Pj · d−αju
≥ β (1)
where 2 ≤ α ≤ 5 is the path loss exponent that characterizes
the radio signal propagation properties of the environment,
Pi is the transmission power of BS bi, diu is the Euclidian
distance between the BS bi and user device u and N0 is the
Gaussian thermal noise. Assuming specific antenna charac-
teristics, (1) corresponds to the Friis free space radio signal
propagation equation (see [21] Equation (4.1)). It captures how
the reception power depends on the most important factors,
namely on the transmission power and the distance between
transmitter and receiver. Note that we consider the local
average of the received pilot signal as described in [21]. In a
small time scale, the pilot power signals have a time-varying
property due to fading. In our future work, we will consider a
more realistic radio signal modelling that incorporates fading
and more realistic path loss models.
We assume that (1) holds for every point in the area for at
least one base station and the user device u attaches to a base
station bi with the best SINR. Thus, we can write that:
Pi · d−αiu
N0 +
∑
j∈B,j 6=i Pj · d−αju
≥ Pl · d
−α
lu
N0 +
∑
m∈B,l 6=m Pm · d−αmu
(2)
for any other base station bl.
We abstract away the mobiles and assume that their ex-
pected position is uniformly distributed over the area. Let us
assume that reception is possible everywhere in the area and
that α = 2 (this means that the pilot signals propagate in
an open area). Then (2) defines a Multiplicatively Weighted
Voronoi power diagram (MW power diagram) [19], which
defines the set of points in the area (potential places of user
devices) that belong to a given base station. In the MW power
diagram, a point belongs to a base station if it is “closer” to
it than to any other base station, where the distance is defined
as follows:
Denition 1: The multiplicatively weighted power distance
between the points u and bi is defined as:
dmpw(u, bi;wi) =
d2iu
wi
(3)
where diu is the Euclidian distance between the points u and
bi and wi is a weight assigned to point i.
We can define the Voronoi region V (bi) around a base
station bi ∈ B as the set of points u that are “closer” to point
bi than to any other point bj , where bi 6= bj . Hence, we can
write V (bi) as:
V (bi) = {u|dmpw(u, bi;wi) ≤ dmpw(u, bj ;wj) for i 6= j}
(4)
We can write the Voronoi diagram of V (B) as:
V(B) =
⋃
V (bi) (5)
where bi ∈ B.
Due to the complex shape of the Voronoi diagram with
multiplicatively weighted distances, it is difficult to derive an-
alytical solutions for the pilot power control problem. Hence,
3we apply a radio range model that is widely used in the
literature. We will show in Section III-E that the principles
derived from the range model hold for the physical model as
well.
Let us derive from (1) the radio range of the pilot signal of
the BS bi as the Euclidian distance within which the users are
able to attach to this base station if there is no interference:
ri =
α
√
Pi
βN0
(6)
Assuming an open area propagation (i.e., α = 2), we can
define the Additively Weighted Voronoi power diagram (AW
power diagram) [19]. In the AW power diagram, the distance
is defined as follows:
Denition 2: The additively weighted power distance be-
tween the points u and bi is defined as:
dapw(u, bi;wi) = d
2
iu − wi (7)
where diu is the Euclidian distance between the points u and
bi and wi is a weight assigned to point bi.
In this paper, we substitute wi = r2i and hence we obtain a
Voronoi diagram in the Laguerre geometry [19]. This model
corresponds to a Voronoi diagram, where the distance is
defined as a tangential Euclidean distance to circles with a
center of the base stations and the radius of their radio ranges,
respectively.
We assume that the base stations are placed on the vertices
of a two-dimensional lattice in an alternating way such that any
BS that belongs to operator A has four neighboring BS-s that
belong to operator B (a small part of the network is shown in
Figure 1). Let us call d the smallest Euclidian distance between
base stations. In Section IV and V, we will extend our model
to general network topologies.
A
AB
B
d
Fig. 1. Base stations on the vertices of a two-dimensional lattice. Here A is
the operator with a larger radio range.
To further specify our model, we assume that:
• A1: Operators want to provide wireless access service
everywhere. Thus, no place remains uncovered in the
area.
• A2: Operators can estimate or measure their coverage.
• A3: Each BS belonging to the same operator has the
same radio range. We show in Section IV that relaxing
this assumption makes the power control problem NP-
complete.
• A4: There exists a limitation PMAX on the transmission
power of the base station, which is defined by the regu-
lator of the wireless spectrum. Then, the maximum radio
range RMAX can be derived from (6) by substituting
Pi = PMAX . Furthermore, if the radio ranges of all base
stations bm ∈ B are equal, we denote the minimum radio
range for which A1 holds by RMIN =
√
2
2
d.
• A5: The users can freely roam between any of the
base stations (i.e., the operators do not disable roaming
between their networks).
• A6: The base stations and the mobile devices have
omnidirectional antennae. The investigation of the effect
of directional antennas is part of our future work.
These assumptions ensure an open spectrum environment,
in which users enjoy ubiquitous wireless connectivity. In
particular, we make Assumption A3, as well as the assumption
that the base stations are placed on the vertices of a grid, to
make the model tractable. This special scenario is reasonable
for a small number of base stations, such as for a small city
network. We show stability points for this special model. We
were motivated to study this special model, because we wanted
to provide some quantitative insights into the power control
problem. We believe our paper to be one of the first steps
towards a deeper understanding of the tradeoffs of operating
cellular networks in shared spectrum. The general problem is
very involved: We show that if operators can set an arbitrary
radio range for their base stations (i.e., A3 does not hold), then
the power control problem is hard to solve. Then, assuming
that A3 holds, we prove a condition for which cooperation can
be enforced.
B. Power Control Game
We model the power control problem with two operators as
a two-player, nonzero-sum game. We refer to the two operators
as players A and B, respectively. Due to A3, we designate
the radio ranges of the pilot signal of the players by rA and
rB . The strategy of the players defines their best radio range.
The goal of the players is to maximize the area they cover
with their pilot signal as expressed by their utility function.
To express the utility of the players formally, let us introduce
the following concepts.
Assume that the two players choose a different radio range.
Let us call the player with the larger radio range heavy and
the player with the smaller range light. In the following, we
assume that A is the heavy player and B is the light player;
note, however, that it can be the opposite due to the symmetric
situation. Let us denote the radio range of the heavy player by
rH and the one of the light player by rL (recall from A3 that
a player has the same range for all of its base stations). Since
the placement of the BS-s is symmetric and the players apply
the same radio range to all of their BS-s, we can analyze the
game considering two neighboring base stations, as shown in
Figure 2.
We define the coverage area (Oi) for any BS bi as its
Voronoi region V (bi) in the radio range model (i.e., in the
4rH rL
H L
OL = coverage area of the light player
YL = interference area of the light player
OH = coverage area of the heavy player
d
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rH rL
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(OL = coverage area of the light player is zero)
d
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Coverage and interference area of a base station, illustrated with two base stations: (a) both BS-s have a coverage area; (b) the BS-s of the light
player are overwhelmed by the BS-s of the heavy player; the light player has no coverage area at all.
Voronoi diagram in the Laguerre geometry). We define the
interference area (Yi) for a BS bi as:
Yi = Ti −Oi = r2i · pi −Oi (8)
where Ti is the total area covered by the radio range and ri
denotes the radio range of BS bi.
Note that the coverage area of a player depends on the radio
range of the other player. Accordingly, we can distinguish two
cases as follows.
In the first case, both players have a non-empty coverage
area as presented in Figure 2a. For this case, the following
condition holds:
rH <
√
r2L + d
2 (C1)
We can express the coverage area of the heavy player by
calculating the area of the octagon. As shown in Figure 2,
this area can be calculated based on the distance d of the two
base stations, the distances HP and LP and the ranges rH
and rL. Thus, we can write the coverage area as follows:
OH =
d4 + 2d2(r2H − r2L)− (r2H − r2L)2
d2
(9)
The coverage area of the light player is as follows:
OL =
(d2 − r2H + r2L)2
d2
(10)
If Condition C1 does not hold, then the light player is
overwhelmed by the heavy player, meaning that the pilot signal
of the heavy player is the strongest everywhere (as presented
in Figure 2b). If the heavy player overwhelms the light player,
the coverage area functions are as follows:
OH = (
√
2d)2 = 2d2 (11)
OL = 0 (12)
In addition to C1, we can derive a condition for the radio
ranges of the two players from A1 as follows:
r2H ≥ (
√
2
2
d− rL)2 + (
√
2
2
d)2 = d2 −
√
2drL + r
2
L (C2)
In the limit case, in which the equality holds in (C2), they just
cover the area (as shown in Figure 1).
From (C2) and A4, we can derive the definition interval for
rH : √
d2 −
√
2drL + r2L ≤ rH ≤ RMAX (13)
Similarly, from (C2) we get the bounds on rL knowing that
it is positive and smaller than rH :
max{0,
√
2
2
(d−
√
−d2 + 2r2H)} ≤ rL ≤ rH (14)
The upper bound comes from the fact that rH ≤
√
2
2
(d +√
−d2 + 2r2H) for all values of rH . Note that the expressions
in (13) and (14) always take real values.
We assume that the goal of the players is to maximize their
utility, in other words to increase their coverage area while
minimizing their interference area (i.e., the area, which is in
their radio range, but they do not cover eventually). We define
the utility per base station for player i playing ri given that
the other player j plays rj at its BS-s as follows2:
Ui(ri, rj) = Oi − γi · Yi = (1 + γi) ·Oi − γi · r2i · pi (15)
where γi ≥ 0 is a sensitivity parameter that defines how much
player i cares about the size of its interference area.
Let us graphically present the utilities of the players based
on expression (15). Figure 3a presents an example for the
utility of the heavy player for a fixed value of rL and Figure 3b
presents the utility of the light player for a fixed value of rH .
In the next section, we derive stability points in the game using
these utility functions.
III. SINGLE-STAGE GAME
In this section, we consider a single-stage game, where
both players simultaneously choose their radio range once and
2Note that due to the specific scenario, the utility of player i can be
calculated by multiplying Ui with the number of its base stations. In this
scenario, we refer to the utility per base station as the utility of the player.
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Fig. 3. Utility function (a) of the heavy player for d = 1km, γH = 0.1, rL = 0.6km and RMAX = 1.5km (defined by the regulator); and (b) of the
light player for d = 1km, γL = 0.1 and rH = 1.5km.
forever. This corresponds to the case in which the base stations
are not able to perform power control during the operation of
the network, thus the radio power has to be set manually at
the installation of the base stations. We use this basic scenario
to study the basic equilibria of the power control game. We
extend our investigation to more complex scenarios in the
following sections.
We make use of the concept of Nash equilibrium [8], [18],
[20] to show stability points in the game. Let us denote the
strategy of player i by si ∈ S and the strategy of the other
player by sj ∈ S, where S is the set of strategies (i.e., the
set of possible radio ranges). Then, we can define the best
response function of player i as follows (as presented in [20]
Equation (15.1)):
Denition 3: For any sj ∈ S, define BRi(sj) to be the set
of player i’s best strategies given sj .
BRi(sj) = {si ∈ S : Ui(si, sj) ≥ Ui(s
′
i, sj), ∀s
′
i ∈ S}
Based on this definition, we can formulate the Nash equi-
libria as follows (corresponds to Equation (15.2) in [20]):
Denition 4: In a Nash equilibrium, in which the players
play sˆi and sˆj , we have:
sˆi ∈ BRi(sˆj), i ∈ {A,B}
Hence, in a Nash equilibrium, none of the players is motivated
to change its strategy. This formulation shows us a method to
find Nash equilibria: we first find the best response function
for each player, then we identify a set of strategies for which
Definition 4 holds.
A. Best Response of the Heavy Player
From the utility functions of the heavy player presented in
Figure 3a, we see that the utility is a concave function with a
maximum point rH,top. We can derive rH,top by maximizing
(15) with the coverage area defined in (9).
rH,top =
√
2(1 + γH)(d2 + r2L)− d2γHpi√
2
√
1 + γH
(16)
We can identify different best response strategies, correspond-
ing to the interval in which the utility function is defined, as
follows.
1) If rH,top <
√
d2 −√2drL + r2L, then the best response
of the heavy player is the lower bound in (13), because
the utility function is strictly decreasing:
BRH(rL) =
√
d2 −
√
2drL + r2L (17)
2) If
√
d2 −√2drL + r2L < rH,top < RMAX , then the
best response is (this corresponds to Figure 3a).
BRH(rL) = rH,top (18)
3) Finally, if rH,top > RMAX , then the best response of
the heavy player is:
BRH(rL) = RMAX (19)
The resulting functions are shown in Figure 4a. Note that
the shape of the second part depends on the value of γH . If
γH <
2
pi−2 , then the second part of the function is convex; if
γH =
2
pi−2 , the second part is linear; otherwise it is concave.
If γH > 2pi−2 , then the function is limited by rL = RMAX
and the third part does not exist.
B. Best Response of the Light Player
We can now derive the best response strategies for the light
player. From the utility function, we see that the best response
strategy should be one of the bounds as defined in (14).
Let us define the knockout (KO) range of the heavy player
as the range rH for which the light player’s utility playing
the upper bound in (14) equals to the utility playing the lower
bound. If the heavy player plays a radio range larger than the
knockout range of the light player, then the light player should
play its minimum range (it is knocked out from the game).
If γL > 1pi−1 , we can write the knockout range as:
r∗H =
√
5 + γL(10− 4pi) + γ2L(5− 4pi + pi2)
2(1 + γL)
· d < d (20)
and if γL ≤ 1pi−1 the knockout range is:
d ≤ r∗∗H =
√
1 + γL
γLpi
· d (21)
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Fig. 4. Best response function (a) BRH of the heavy player for various γH values for d = 1km; and (b) BRL of the light player for different γL values
for d = 1km.
Thus, we can write the best response of the light player as:
1) If γL > 1pi−1 and
√
d2 −√2drL + r2L ≤ rH ≤ r∗H , then
the best response is:
BRL(rH) = rH (22)
2) If γL > 1pi−1 and rH > r
∗
H , then the best response is:
BRL(rH) =
√
2
2
(d−
√
−d2 + 2r2H) (23)
3) If γL ≤ 1pi−1 and
√
d2 −√2drL + r2L ≤ rH ≤ r∗∗H ,
then the best response is BRL(rH) = rH .
4) If γL ≤ 1pi−1 and rH > r∗∗H , then the best response is
BRL(rH) = 0.
Figure 4b shows the possible best response functions for
the light player.
For the first and third case, the maximum radio (rL = rH )
range results in the optimal utility:
UL(rH , rH) = (1 + γL)d
2 − γLr2Hpi (24)
If the second case is true, then the minimum radio range is the
optimal one. We can write the optimal utility if BRL(rH) =√
2
2
(d−
√
−d2 + 2r2H) as :
UL(BRL(rH), rH) =
= (2− γL(pi − 2))(r2H − d
√
−d2 + 2r2H) (25)
Finally, in the fourth case, the optimal utility is zero.
C. Nash Equilibria in the Single Stage Game
Using the best response functions derived for both players,
we can identify Nash equilibria in the single stage game.
1) An infinite number of Nash equilibria exist if
a) γL > 1pi−1 or;
b) γH = 2pi−2 .
2) Two Nash equilibria exist if γL = 1pi−1 and γH >
2
pi−2 .
3) There is a unique Nash equilibrium for the following
sensitivity values:
a) γL = 1pi−1 and γH <
2
pi−2 ;
b) γL < 1pi−1 , γH <
2
pi−2 and r
∗∗
H ≥ RMAX ;
c) γL < 1pi−1 , γH >
2
pi−2 ;
4) No Nash equilibrium exists if γL < 1pi−1 , γH <
2
pi−2
and r∗∗H < RMAX .
Table I shows the number and the types of different equi-
libria as a function of the sensitivity values of the players.
In parentheses we write RMIN or RMAX if a Nash equi-
librium exists in which both players play (RMIN , RMIN ) or
(RMAX , RMAX ), respectively. We write knockout (KO) if the
heavy player forces the light player to play its minimum radio
range and we write equal if they have the same radio range.
The theorem can be proven for each possible value of
γL and γH by solving the corresponding equations (17),
(18), (19), (22) and (23) and the crossing points of the best
response functions result in the Nash equilibria as defined in
Definition 4.
D. Equilibrium Selection
From Table I, we can observe that there is a variety of
Nash equilibria depending on the parameters (i.e., sensitivity,
maximum radio range) in the power control game. In order to
assess the success of the players in these Nash equilibria, we
use the concept of Pareto-optimality.
Denition 5: A pair of radio ranges is Pareto-optimal (or
socially optimal), if none of the players can increase its utility
unless the utility of another player decreases.
In order to assess the feasible region (all possible values
of the utilities) of the radio ranges, we show the utilities for
each possible values of rA and rB in Figure 5. Furthermore.
let us distinguish the KO state in which the light player plays
rL = 0 and denote it by KO0.
The following theorem shows that, depending on the pa-
rameter values, two states can be socially optimal.
Theorem 1: If several Nash-equilibria exist in the grid
scenario, then the Pareto-optimal (socially optimal) Nash-
equilibria are as follows:
1) Both players playing RMIN is Pareto-optimal, if:
a) γH > 2pi−2 or
b) γH = 2pi−2 and γL <
2
pi−2 .
2) The RMIN and KO0 solutions are both Pareto-optimal,
if γH = γL = 2pi−2 .
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NUMBER OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE SINGLE STAGE GAME AS A FUNCTION OF THE SENSITIVITY VALUES.
γH <
2
pi−2 γH =
2
pi−2 γH >
2
pi−2
γL <
1
pi−1 0 or 1 (RMAX ) ∞ (equal or RMIN ) 1 (RMIN )
γL =
1
pi−1 1 (KO) ∞ (KO or equal or RMIN ) 2 (KO or RMIN )
γL >
1
pi−1 ∞ (KO) ∞ (KO or equal or RMIN ) ∞ (KO or RMIN )
TABLE II
THE BEST (PARETO-OPTIMAL) NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE REPEATED GAME AS A FUNCTION OF THE SENSITIVITY VALUES.
γH <
2
pi−2 γH =
2
pi−2 γH >
2
pi−2
γL <
1
pi−1 RMAX RMIN RMIN
γL =
1
pi−1 KO0 RMIN RMIN
1
pi−1 < γL <
2
pi−2 KO0 RMIN RMIN
γL =
2
pi−2 KO0 KO0 or RMIN RMIN
γL >
2
pi−2 KO0 KO0 RMIN
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Fig. 5. The utilities for the possible values of rA and rB if d = 1km and
γA = γB = 0.1.
3) The KO0 solution is Pareto-optimal, if:
a) γH < 2pi−2 or
b) γH = 2pi−2 and γL >
2
pi−2
We provide the proof of the theorem in Appendix I-A.
This theorem shows that if several Nash equilibria exist in
the grid scenario, then playing either RMIN or KO0 is a good
choice, from the social point of view, for given sensitivity
values. Except for γH = γL = 2pi−2 , the given equilibrium is
the unique Pareto-optimal solution.
Based on Theorem 1, we can identify the most beneficial
Nash equilibria from Table I. We express this modified solution
in Table II.
Table II shows that if the operators are sensitive to inter-
ference, then they should play RMIN . However, if one of
the players is not sensitive to interference and the other is
sensitive, then the non-sensitive player can increase its radio
range to force the sensitive player out of the game. If none of
the players cares about interference, then they will end up in
both playing the maximum radio range.
E. Discussion
Our model based on the Voronoi diagram in the Laguerre
geometry results in coverage areas with straight separation
lines. We adopted this model, because if we applied the
physical radio model based on (1), it would be difficult to
derive a closed-form expression for the coverage and hence
for the utility of the players. We use a numerical method to
compare the radio range model to the physical model and to
show that the principles derived in our model hold for the
physical model as well.
We compare the coverage areas in both models as follows.
We transform the continuous area into a discrete area by
substituting it with a grid of side  as shown in Figure 6.
In our numerical study we use a grid of 100x100 points.
A
AB
B
d
B
B
AA
A
ε
Fig. 6. Discrete area model with points in  distance.
For a given set of radio ranges, we determine the number
of points that belong to the base station in the middle of the
considered area in each of the radio models. This results in
an empirical value of the coverage area. We substitute this
coverage area value into (15) to obtain the utility of the players
in both cases and then we calculate the best responses from
the utility function. Figure 7 shows an example of the best
response of player i who controls the base station in the middle
of Figure 6 for each of the radio models.
We can observe that the best response functions are very
similar for the two models. We performed our numerical
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Fig. 7. Best response function of player i for γi = γj = 0.1, d = 500m
and RMAX = 700m.
analysis for various values of γi and γj and it resulted in the
same conclusion. Hence, the players playing RMIN , RMAX or
being in the KO0 state are the Nash equilibria in the physical
model as well. However, the derivation of the precise values of
γH and γL requires an extensive set of numerical calculations.
This fact motivated us to study the problem based on the radio
range model.
IV. NP-COMPLETENESS OF THE GENERAL PROBLEM
In this section, we analyze the power control problem for
general network topologies and for general values of radio
ranges in the single stage game.
The goal of player i is to allocate the radio ranges such that
their overall utility Ui =
∑|Bi|
bm=1
Um is maximized, where |Bi|
is the number of bases stations that belong to player i and the
utility per base station Um is as follows (derived from (15)).
Ui =
|Bi|∑
m=1
[
(1 + γi) ·Om − γ · r2m · pi
]
(26)
where Om is the coverage area and rm is the radio range of
base station bm.
We can now formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Finding the maximum utility of player i for
general values of radio ranges is NP-complete.
We provide the proof in Appendix I-B.
Since finding the maximum utility for an operator is NP-
complete in general, it is impossible to calculate best responses
for a given player in polynomial time. Thus, we can state the
following result.
Corollary 1: Finding Nash equilibria in the power control
game for general values of radio ranges is NP-complete.
V. REPEATED GAME
In the previous section, we assumed that the radio range of
the base stations has to be set in advance and no power adjust-
ment is possible. In this section, we consider the possibility
of an iterative power control in a repeated game. We assume
that the operators do not know the end of the game, hence
we study the problem in an infinite repeated game model with
discounting [2], [8]. Note that we consider a two-player game
with a general topology of base stations.
We extend the single-stage game as follows: We assume
that the game is split up into steps denoted by t. In each step,
player i ∈ {A,B} adjusts the radio range of its base stations
according to its strategy si.
If the optimal solution is unknown, then the players might
be tempted to play RMAX at each of the base stations. In
this case, the coverage areas of their base stations define the
ordinary Voronoi diagram of the area [19] (i.e., a Voronoi
diagram with Euclidian distances). Let us consider an arbitrary
base station bm and its neighbors as shown in Figure 8.
Assuming that the base stations have the same radio range
over their whole network (i.e., A3 is fulfilled and the radio
ranges of the two players are equal). We define Rm,MIN
as the smallest common range with which they can cover
the whole space around bm. Obviously, playing Rm,MIN is
more beneficial than playing RMAX 3. Let us denote RMIN =
maxm[Rm,MIN ] (meaning that it is the smallest common
range which enables the coverage of the total area).
bm
RMAX
Rm,MIN
Tm (the total area) 
covered with RMAX 
Tm (the total area) 
covered with Rm,MIN 
Fig. 8. Voronoi tesselation for a general topology, where A3 applies (i.e., the
radio ranges are the same). RMAX is defined by the regulator and Rm,MIN
is the smallest range with which they can cover the whole space around base
station bm.
Furthermore, let us define the discounted cumulative utility
in k < ∞ time steps as:
U¯i(k) =
k∑
t=0
Ui(t) · ωt (27)
where 0 < ω < 1 is the discounting factor, which expresses
the value of future utilities for the players. The discounting
factor is sometimes interpreted as a value related to the
probability that the game ends in the subsequent time slot4.
We now prove a theorem to show the conditions for which
cooperation can be enforced. Then we calculate specific values
for the grid scenario.
Theorem 3: If both players always play RMAX , it is a Nash
equilibrium if RMAX < r∗∗H holds.
Recall that r∗∗H is defined in (21).
Proof: Let us assume that player i plays RMAX all the
time. Since the decision of the other player does not affect
its radio range, we can analyze the game by time steps. In
any time step, player i necessarily becomes the heavy player
(or they are of equal weight). If RMAX < r∗∗H , then the best
strategy of the other player is rL = rH = RMAX in every
time step.
3Recall that RMAX is defined in A4.
4Based on this interpretation, we assume that the discounting factor is the
same for both players.
9In this case, the players are in a socially non-optimal
equilibrium. We prove in this section that they can do better,
by applying a strategy called Punisher.
Denition 6: If player i plays the Punisher strategy, it plays
RMIN in the first time step. For any further time steps, it
plays:
• RMIN in the next time step if the other player played
RMIN in the previous time step, or
• RMAX for the next ki time steps, if the other player
played anything else.
The parameter ki (also called the punishment interval) defines
the number of time steps for which player i punishes the other
player. Note that the Punisher strategy is similar to the well-
known Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy [2]5. The major difference
is that it retaliates any defection by playing RMAX instead of
copying the same behavior.
If both players cooperate, they play RMIN . In this case they
both have the cooperative utility Ci = UH(RMIN , RMIN )6. If
player i defects, while the other player does not, the defecting
player has a cheating gain Gi = UH(BRi(RMIN ), RMIN ).
If both players defect, they have a defection utility Di =
UH(RMAX , RMAX).
Using this notation, we can prove a specific equilibrium is
socially optimal.
Theorem 4: A Nash equilibrium based on RMIN is en-
forceable with the Punisher strategy (i.e., player i is able to
punish the defection of the other player j) if
Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω) < 1 (28)
where ω ≤ 1, γi 6= 0, γj 6= 0 and RMAX < r∗∗H . If the above
condition holds, the punishment interval is defined by:
ki ≥ logω
(
1− Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω)
)
− 1 (29)
We refer to Appendix I-C for the proof of the theorem. Note
that for ω = 1, cooperation can always be enforced using the
Punisher strategy. This principle is expressed in general by the
Nash folk theorem [8].
In general topologies, the value of the punishment interval
ki is hard to compute. In the grid scenario (i.e., for the basic
scenario presented in Section III), however, we can calculate
the necessary value of ki as follows. Substituting γj to γH ,
we can obtain this value from (16):
BRj(RMIN ) =
d2(3− (pi − 3)γj))
2(1 + γj)
(30)
If we substitute ri = rL = RMIN into (15), we get the
cheating gain Gj = UH(BRj(RMIN ), RMIN ):
Gj =
d2(8 + (16− 6pi)γj + (8− 6pi + pi2)γ2j )
4(1 + γj)
(31)
In the following ki time steps, player i plays RMAX , because
it plays the Punisher strategy. Consequently, player j has to
5TFT defines the choice of a given player in the next time slot, while the
Punisher strategy defines the punishment interval as a set of subsequent time
slots.
6Note that for rA = rB , UH(rA, rB) = UL(rA, rB). Hence we can
apply any of the two utility functions.
play RMAX in the subsequent time slots as well (given that
RMAX < r
∗∗
H ). Its utility for the next ki time slots is the
defection utility Dj :
Dj = (1 + γj)d
2 − γjR2MAXpi (32)
Otherwise, if it played RMIN , it would have a cooperation
utility Cj for all the ki time slots:
Cj =
d2(2− (pi − 2)γj)
2
(33)
The typical value of ki is small (for d = 1km, γj = 0.1,
RMAX = 1.5km and ω = 0.1, the value is ki = d1.23e = 2).
For higher values of γj , RMAX and ω, the punishment interval
is one time slot (i.e., there is an immediate punishment).
Figure 9 illustrates the average per time slot utility of a player
for both cooperation and defection. One can observe that
cooperation is more beneficial, because defection is quickly
retaliated by the other player.
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Fig. 9. Average utility for d = 1km, γj = 0.1, RMAX = 1.5km and
ω = 0.1 if both player apply the Punisher strategy. Defection is quickly
retaliated and hence cooperation is the best choice.
Based on Theorem 4, we state the following result.
Corollary 2: If both players play the Punisher strategy and
the conditions of Theorem 4 hold, then it results in a Nash
equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of co-
existing wireless operators in a shared spectrum. We have
assumed that the operators apply power control at the base
stations to mitigate interference, while providing a permanent
service to the users. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
is the first to investigate this problem.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we have
shown that Nash equilibria exist if the operators set the power
of their base stations at the beginning of the operation of the
network. We have identified different equilibrium situations
depending on the sensitivity of the operators to interference.
Second, we have shown that the solution of the power control
problem is NP-complete for a general topology of base sta-
tions. Third, we have proved a condition for which a socially
optimal Nash equilibrium exists and that it can be enforced
using punishments. This result holds in both the grid scenario
(in which we derived the necessary “amounts of punishment”)
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and in the general topology with common radio ranges. In
general, our results show which operation points are beneficial
for the players and how these should be achieved.
In terms of future work, we will solve the power control
problem by designing an approximation algorithm that con-
verges to a desirable equilibrium situation for a general set
of radio ranges; in particular, we will study the properties of
the convergence by simulations. Furthermore, we will consider
power control on the data channels as well. We also intend to
study the effect of other techniques to mitigate interference,
such as directional antennae and mobile devices with multiple
antennae.
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APPENDIX I
PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
If any of the players increases its radio range, then it
becomes a heavy player (note that the case is symmetric, so the
proof holds no matter which player increases its radio range).
For the light player, it is sufficient to prove the theorem for the
best response strategies of the light player, because the utility
of the light player is maximized for these values.
First, let us consider the case in which rH < r∗H or rH <
r∗∗H , thus the light player should play the same radio range.
We see that the utility function of the light player as presented
in (24) is a decreasing function of rH , hence the theorem is
true for this case. Note that in this case the utility of the heavy
player does not increase either.
For the knockout state, in which rH ≥ r∗H , the best response
of the light player is to play its minimum radio range, which
is different from zero. The utility for the minimum radio range
is defined by (25). If γL < 2pi−2 , then this utility is smaller
than the utility in the RMIN state, thus the theorem holds. If
γL ≥ 2pi−2 , then the utility of the light player is maximized
for rL = 0, which is Pareto-superior to the utility achieved in
KO states with other ranges.
If the utility function of the light player is zero (for γL ≤
1
pi−1 ), we have to solve
UL(RMIN ) ≥ UL(0) (34)
Inequality (34) holds if γL ≤ 2pi−2 . Thus, it holds for all cases,
where γL ≤ 1pi−1 .
Finally, let us consider the case γL ≥ 2pi−2 , in which the
utility of the light player is increased compared to the case
where both play RMIN . Let us compare the utility of the
heavy player as presented in (15) in the two situations. In the
first case (KO0 state), we have rH = d and rL = 0, and
in the second case, we have rH = rL =
√
2
2
d. The results
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show that if γH > 2pi−2 , then the utility of the heavy player
playing in the RMIN state is higher than in the KO0 state.
For γH = 2pi−2 the utilities in the two states are equal and for
γH <
2
pi−2 the utility in the KO0 state is higher.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem, let us consider the special case of
finding the optimal radio range allocation in the presence of
a single operator. In this case, operator i has the utility:
Ui =
|Bi|∑
bm=1
[
(1 + γi) ·Om − γ · r2m · pi
]
(35)
Let us denote the total area by Otot =
∑|Bi|
bm=1
Om. Since
the γi values are the same for all base stations, we can
reformulate the utility as:
Ui = (1 + γ) ·Otot − γi · pi
|Bi|∑
bm=1
r2m (36)
Under the assumption that α = 2, the power is proportional
to the square of the radio range. Chamaret et al. [4] as well as
Va¨rbrand and Yuan [24] have proven that finding the minimum
power allocation in the network of a cellular operator while
maintaining the total coverage is NP-complete. Hence, the
minimum value of Ui cannot be determined in polynomial
time. Because the problem is NP-complete for the special case
of one operator, we conclude that it is NP-complete in the
general game as well.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
Let us assume that player j deviates in time step t0. Let
us assume that it applies the best option, hence it plays
BRj(RMIN ). The Punisher strategy played by player i re-
duces the discounted cumulative utility of player j for the
time interval from t0 to t0 + ki if:
Gj + Dj ·
ki∑
t=1
ωt ≤ Cj ·
ki∑
t=0
ωt (37)
If ω = 1, we can write (37) as follows:
Gj + Dj · ki ≤ Cj · (ki + 1) (38)
Hence, we obtain the following bound on the punishment
interval:
ki ≥ Gj − Cj
Cj −Dj (39)
Note that if ω = 1, then cooperation is always enforceable.
Now if ω < 1, we can transform the sums in (37) to the
same intervals:
Gj −Dj + Dj ·
ki∑
t=0
ωt ≤ Cj ·
ki∑
t=0
ωt (40)
Since the sums are geometric sequences, we can write that:
Gj −Dj ≤ (Cj −Dj) · 1− ω
ki+1
1− ω (41)
Given that Cj − Dj > 0 and 1 − ω > 0, we can rewrite the
inequality:
Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω) ≤ 1− ω
ki+1 (42)
Reordering the inequality gives us:
ωki+1 ≤ 1− Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω) (43)
This gives the condition on ki, because the left side is strictly
positive. Thus the inequality cannot be fulfilled if the right
side is non-positive.
Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω) ≤ 1 (44)
If the condition in (44) holds, we can take the logarithm of
both sides in (43). Since ω < 1, the logarithm function is
strictly decreasing and hence the direction of the inequality
changes.
ki ≥ logω
(
1− Gj −Dj
Cj −Dj · (1− ω)
)
− 1 (45)
Due to the symmetric situation, the same arguments apply
for the opposite case that defines the punishment interval for
player j.
APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY
We provide the list of symbols used in the paper in Table III.
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TABLE III
TABLE OF SYMBOLS USED IN THE PAPER
Symbol Denition Section
A and B operators / players Section II
Bi set of the base stations of operator i Section II
B set of all base stations Section II
α path loss exponent Section II
β required signal-to-interference-noise ratio for a success-
ful reception at a receiver
Section II
Pi transmission power of base station bi Section II
N0 Gaussian thermal noise Section II
diu Euclidian distance between base station bi and user u Section II
dmpw(u, bi;wi) multiplicative power distance between between base
station bi and user u with the weight wi
Section II
dapw(u, bi;wi) additive power distance between between base station bi
and user u with the weight wi
Section II
d smallest Euclidian distance between base stations in the
grid scenario
Section II
V (bi) Voronoi region of base station bi Section II
V(B) Voronoi diagram of all base stations Section II
ri radio range of base station bi Section II
RMAX maximum radio range allowed by the regulator Section II
RMIN =
√
2
2
d minimum common radio range to cover the whole area Section II
rA and rB radio ranges of the operators Section II
rH radio range of the player with the higher power Section II
rL radio range of the player with the lower power Section II
Oi coverage area of player i Section II
Yi interference area of player i Section II
Ti total coverage area of player i Section II
Ui utility of player i Section II
γi sensitivity of player i to interference Section II
S the set of strategies Section III
si strategy of player i Section III
BRi(rj) best response strategy of player i to rj Section III
rH,top maximum utility of player i as defined in (16) Section III
r∗H and r
∗∗
H knockout (KO) ranges for the heavy player Section III
KO0 knockout state in which the light player plays rL = 0 Section III
U¯i(k) cumulative utility of player i in k time steps Section V
ki punishment interval of player i in the repeated game Section V
Utot total utility of player i for all its BS-s Section IV
Otot total area of player i for all its BS-s Section IV
Rm,MIN minimum radio range to cover the area around BS bm Section IV
Ci cooperative utility of player i Section V
Gi cheating gain of player i Section V
Di defective utility of player i Section V
